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ABSTRACT – This paper emphasizes the main goals of using derivatives as a monetary tool, 
increasing the foreign currency liquidity of commercial banks and controlling the volatility of the 
national currency. 
Over the past few years, FX swaps, very often mistaken for currency swaps, became a popular 
monetary instrument among central banks. Since 2007, inter-central bank swap credit lines have 
become a role model for supporting the foreign currency liquidity of national commercial banks. 
The National Bank of Serbia introduced FX swap transactions as part of a special facility for 
supporting the country’s financial stability. Our research indicates that the NBS is not part of a swap 
credit line, but rather uses FX swaps internally and in a very fragmented manner. The trading volume 
of the newly-introduced instrument has been quite modest. The quiet introduction of FX swaps has 
failed to make any insignificant impact on the stabilization of the national currency, and has caused a 
fairly minor increase in EUR liquidity. At the very end it is worth mentioning that, regardless of the 
first results, NBS swaps mean that the Serbian forex derivative market has “crossed the Rubicon”. 
 
KEY WORDS: FX swap, monetary policy, central bank, FX currency liquidity, RSD volatility, 
National Bank of Serbia 
Introduction 
The foreign exchange (FX) swap market has grown strongly over the years, reaching a 
notional amount outstanding of more than 30,000 billion USD in 2009. This rising popularity 
of FX swaps as an instrument for hedging or acquiring FX funding, combined with the role 
of central banks in the FX swap market, has raised questions about the nature of this 
instrument, as well as of its role in macro-financial stability. This question was given 
additional weight by the financial crisis and currency and liquidity shortages. 
One of the main roles of the FX swap at the macro level is to play the role of crucial 
instrument for the smooth functioning of financial markets and monetary intervention. Since 
2007, central banks have increasingly recognized the impact of FX swaps on financial and 
economic stability. 
The statement above is further borne out by their special exemption from US regulatory 
oversight. In August 2009, the US Treasury Department released the Over-the-Counter 
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Derivatives Market Act of 2009 (OCDMA) in order to prevent some of the causes that led to the 
financial crisis. The regulation moved all Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives trading onto 
regulated exchanges, except for FX swaps and forwards. These instruments were excluded as 
they were not considered OTC derivatives under general market conventions because of the 
short-term nature of the contracts, high turnover and real physical exchange of principal. 
Following the introduction of OCDMA, in July 2010, the Senate passed financial markets, 
considered the most comprehensive set of such laws since the 1930s, aiming to significantly 
modify the OTC markets. Under this legislation, FX swaps and forwards are regulated as 
derivatives, but it is left to the Secretary of Treasury to write to relevant congressional 
committees asking for an exemption. In 2011, the US Treasury Department issued a Notice of 
Proposed Determination, stipulating that central clearing and exchange trading requirements 
would not apply to FX swaps and forwards. In addition, the Treasury confirmed that FX 
swaps and forwards market operated at high levels of transparency, with these instruments 
already traded in a highly transparent, liquid, and efficient market. They also pointed out 
that there was a number of unique factors limiting risk in the FX swaps and forwards 
market, such as fixed terms and physical exchange of currency, well-functioning settlement 
process and shorter duration contracts (68 % of the market matures in one week or less, and 
98% in one year or less). 
In April 2009 the National Bank of Serbia (NBS) introduced FX swaps as part of a special 
package of facilities for supporting the country’s financial stability. The main goal was to 
improve the liquidity of national commercial banks (both in euros and dinars, the local 
currency) through swap auctions or as a bilateral agreement between commercial bank and 
the NBS (Decision on Special Facilities Supporting the Country’s Financial Stability, Article 
5). 
Bearing in mind that Serbia has an underdeveloped OTC market and a non-existent 
organized derivatives market, it is very important to address this newly introduced 
instrument, its function, the often overlooked difference between FX and currency swaps, 
market structure, and FX swap influence on financial stability. It should be emphasizes that 
this paper has no intention of addressing the current dispute over additional regulation of 
FX swaps. It focuses on FX swaps as a newly-introduced instrument in an underdeveloped 
financial market (in this case, the Serbian financial market), as well as on the first results 
achieved. 
This paper is organized as follows: the background and key aspects of FX swaps, their 
functioning, valuation and differences in comparison to currency swaps are presented in 
Section 2. Section 3 discusses central banks and FX swaps as a monetary tool used to help 
achieve financial stability. FX swaps introduced by the NBS are comprehensively presented 
in Section 4. Section 5 presents the first findings on the usage of FX swaps by the central bank 
as a monetary tool in an underdeveloped financial market. 
FX swaps  
The Reuters financial glossary defines an FX swap as “simultaneous borrowing and 
lending of one currency for another with two different value dates.” The different value 
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dates usually refer to spot and forward date. FX swaps were introduced into the market at 
the beginning of the 1980s and are extensively used today (Table 1).1 
Dealing with FX swaps has certain advantages. Firstly, they are an interbank instrument 
which usually excludes clients. Because of counterparties included, it is perceived as an 
instrument with minimal counterparty risk. Secondly, an FX swap does not assume that 
banks are buying or selling deposits – they are exchanging them. And finally, in some cases, 
it is an off-balance-sheet item, so it does not influence assets and liabilities. 
 
Table 1. Amounts Outstanding of OTC Foreign Exchange Derivatives  
(in billions of USD) 
 
 
Source: BIS Statistics 
 
There are three common types of FX swaps: spot against forward, forward against 
forward and short dates forward. In the first case, the first exchange of money takes place on 
a spot date (2 business days) and the reverse exchange of money takes place on the future 
date. The second type of FX swap, forward against forward, assumes that the first exchange 
takes place on a forward date and the reverse exchange is on a later forward date. Short date 
FX swaps are swaps which run for less than a month. 
In case of FX swaps, counterparties can agree on having a clearinghouse involved. In that 
case, the counterparties initially trade up to an agreed threshold of exposure (margin 
threshold) based on each counterparty’s credit rating. A margin call is made by a 
counterparty when its FX swap position is “in the money,” i.e., when the position of the 
other party is “out of the money.” Cash or securities deposited in a margin account can be 
used as collateral (Barkbu and Ong: 2010). 
International Accounting Standard IAS 39 applies to FX swap accounting. As there is no 
initial cost in case of financial derivatives, they would usually be presented in financial 
statements in the form of a note to the accounts. However, IAS 39 brings derivatives onto 
financial statements to increase the transparency of risk exposures. FX swaps are carried on 
the balance sheet at their fair value which is zero on the day the FX swap is transacted. On 
the balance sheet the value of an FX swap may be positive (if the swap is in-the-money and 
an asset), negative (if the swap is out-of-the-money and a liability) or zero (Barkbu and Ong: 
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2010). At this juncture we need to emphasize that not all countries follow IAS 39, which 
implies that in some cases FX swaps remain off-balance-sheet. 
Banks quote FX swaps by using swap or forward points instead of outright forward 
quotes. By doing this, risk associated with interest rate differentials is separated from spot 
exchange rate movements. FX swaps are easy to price based on available forward quotations 
and by satisfying the covered interest parity condition. By trading FX swaps, traders are 
basically trading interest rate differentials risks. The FX swap is mainly used for swapping 
surplus currencies; creating deposit borrowings in another currency; as an alternative to non-
liquid money markets; speculation; and roll-over of spot FX position and cash management. 
These swaps are standard OTC instruments that make it possible institutions to fund their 
foreign exchange balances in a more liquid way in comparison to forwards, and are used by 
banks and financial institutions for managing liquidity and shifting delivery dates (Barkbu 
and Ong: 2010).  
The mechanism of the FX swap can be explained by introducing a contractual equation 
to start with (Neftici: 2008). Let us assume there is a forward contract to buy USD against 
EUR. This contract can be replicated with a portfolio made up of a loan denominated in EUR, 
spot purchase of USD against EUR, and a deposit in USD. If we exclude transaction costs, 
bid-ask spread, credit risk and market liquidity, the position can be presented as in Figure 1. 
2 
Figure 1. Contractual Equation 
 
 
Source: Neftici (2008:60) 
 
In comparison to the contractual equation, the construction of an FX swap includes only 
one bid-ask spread (Figure 2). The FX swap is combination of money market deposits and 
money market loans in different currencies written on the same underlying “ticket”. It can be 
seen as an instance of two counterparties spot purchasing and forward selling two currencies 
against each other. Interest rates play a crucial role in this instrument, since not both 
currencies will have equal interest rates between t0 and t1. The difference will be included in 
the amount exchanged at t1 as compensation for one side’s loss. 
                                                     
2 The left and right side generate the same cash flow, although it does not mean that the monetary 
value is the same. In many cases some of the right-hand side contracts may not even exist in a 
particular economy. 
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Figure 2. FX Swap 
 
 
Source: Neftici (2008:67) 
 
The FX swap is not to be confused with the currency swap, which is a different 
instrument. A currency swap is like an exchange of two FRNs (floating rate notes) with 
different currencies. It has two principals in different currencies, which exchange equal 
values at t0. During the period between t0 and t1, the interest in different currencies will be 
received / paid at the agreed interest rate. At the end the principals from t0 will be re-
exchanged. 
Let us assume that there is an agreement to pay 10% on a GBP principal of GBP10,000,000 
and receive 10% on a USD principal of $15,000,000 every year for 5 years. The cash flow is 
presented in Table 2. The typical usage of a currency swap is conversion from a liability in 
one currency to a liability in another currency or conversion from an investment in one 
currency to an investment in another currency. 
 
Table 2. Currency Swap Cash Flow 
 
Year USD in millions GBP in millions 
0 - 15 + 10 
1 + 1.5 - 1 
2 + 1.5 - 1 
3 + 1.5 - 1 
4 + 1.5 - 1 
5 + 16.5 - 11 
 
At t1, money is re-exchanged in the event that either of these instruments is used, but in 
an FX swap it is exchanged at a different exchange rate in comparison to a currency swap, 
where the exchange rate from t0 is used. This is because in an FX swap there are no interim 
interest payments. Two parties exchange currencies for a certain period of time, after which 
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they get their original currencies back. At the same time, the interest rates on those two 
currencies are not the same, so they need to be compensated for by using the exchange rate. 
In case 100,000,000 EUR is received and against these 100,000,000 et0 USD are paid, where et0 
is the EUR/USD exchange rate at t0, the new exchange rate at t1 is (Neftici:2008): 
 
ft0 = et0
1+ Lt 0
USDδ
1+ Lt0
EURδ  
 
where USDtL 0 is the interest rate for USD at t0, 
EUR
tL 0 is the interest rate for EUR at t0,and δ is the 
period of time. The comparison of an FX swap and a currency swap is presented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of Currency and FX swap 
 
 
Source: Neftici (2008:149) 
Central banks and FX swaps 
Although not originally designed by central banks, FX swaps have become part of the 
monetary policy intervention toolkit. In a survey conducted by the Bank for International 
Settlements more than thirteen years ago (BIS 1997:332), seven out of fourteen industrial-
country central banks surveyed said they used FX swaps. They were used against either the 
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US dollar or the Deutschmark (or both), among other tools used to intervene in the open 
market. 
Since then, central banks have discovered that the FX swap could be used for achieving 
other goals as well. In cases where the initiating agent is a central bank, the basic motivations 
for introducing FX swaps are to affect domestic liquidity, to manage foreign exchange 
reserves and to support further development of financial markets. On the odd occasion 
central banks have been known to use it for the main purpose of hedging and asset liability 
management (Bartolini, 2002). 
Central banks like to use FX swaps mainly because this instrument offers flexibility. From 
the viewpoint of central banks’ risk management, FX swaps are generally no riskier than 
standard repo operations. It is also important to notice that, in case of combining FX swaps 
with spot FX interventions, it can lead to significant risk-bearing by the central bank. If the 
central bank uses the foreign currency obtained as collateral in the swap transaction to 
defend exchange parity under pressure, it will incur losses if the defense fails before the 
forward leg of the swap transaction is unwound. FX swaps can be used by the central banks 
as an instrument for reducing volatility of foreign exchange, as well as liquidity. At the same 
time it is important to stress that FX swaps can behave as a magnifying glass in case of non-
liquid markets and during stressful periods by creating more foreign exchange volatility 
instead of reducing it (Barkbu and Ong, 2010).  
The new era for FX swaps started in December 2007, when the Fed introduced an FX 
swap system dubbed “swap lines”. These swap lines were also introduced by other central 
banks (Table 3), as part of sets of measures designed to boost market stability. The program 
enhanced the ability of central banks to provide US dollar funding to financial institutions in 
their jurisdictions. It relieved pressures in USD funding markets and reduced incentives for 
foreign financial institutions to sell dollar assets at fire-sale prices. 
The swap lines system works as follows. In the first step, a foreign central bank draws a 
swap line by selling a specific amount of its national currency for USD at the market 
exchange rate. At the same time the Fed and the foreign central bank agree that the foreign 
central bank will repurchase its currency at the same exchange rate in the future (Fleming 
and Klagge, 2010). Looking only at the first part, this swap seems more like a currency swap 
than an FX swap. The difference appears at the time of maturity of the swap. At the time the 
swap is concluded, the foreign central bank pays the Fed an amount of interest on the dollars 
borrowed equal to the amount that the central bank earned on dollar lending to institutions. 
On the other hand, the Fed does not lend foreign currency and therefore does not pay any 
interest to the foreign central bank. The foreign currency that the Fed acquires is an asset on 
its balance sheet. 
In classical FX or currency swap there is no third contributor. However, in case of swap 
lines created by the Fed, the third contributors are institutions under the jurisdiction of 
foreign central banks, determined by the foreign central bank as eligible. The foreign central 
bank lends dollars to the eligible commercial banks, and has a right to decide on the required 
collateral. 
After introducing it, the Fed rapidly increased the swap credit line, both in terms of 
including more central banks and in terms of dollars committed (Table 3 and Chart 1). 
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Table 3. Swap Lines Opened by the Fed with Central Banks 
 
Date Central Bank 
December 12, 2007 European CB, Swiss National Bank 
September 18, 2008 Bank of Japan, Bank of England, Bank of Canada 
September 24, 2008 
Reserve Bank of Australia, Sveriges Riksbank, Norges Bank, 
Danmarks Nationalbank 
October 28, 2008 Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
October 29, 2008 
Banco Central do Brasil, Banco de Mexico, Bank of Korea, 
Monetary Authority of Singapore 
Source: Fleming and Klagge (2010:3) 
 
During the financial crisis, the Fed introduced the FX swap as a temporary swap line. 
These temporary arrangements expired in February 2010, but in May 2010 they were re-
established with some central banks (Bank of Canada, Bank of England, European Central 
Bank, Bank of Japan, and Swiss National Bank), in response to the re-emergence of strains in 
short-term USD funding markets. The use of swap lines has been minimal since May 2010, 
reaching a peak of USD 9.2 billion compared with a previous peak of USD 586 billion. 
The Fed’s swap lines with the European Central Bank (ECB) played a critical role 
alongside the ECB’s direct efforts to avoid a more rapid reduction in credit in the European 
Union by making it possible for Europe’s banks to borrow USD from the ECB. 
 
Chart 1. USD FX Swap Facility Usage Since Inception 
 
Source: Federal Reserve System 
 
In addition to re-establishing swap lines, in April 2009 the Fed introduced “foreign-
currency liquidity swap lines” which are a mirror image of the previously described FX 
swap line. The idea was to provide capacity to offer liquidity to US institutions in foreign 
currency. These lines were created with the ECB, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, 
and the Swiss National Bank. Moreover, in November 2011 these central banks started 
coordinated action to enhance their capacity to provide liquidity support to the financial 
system. They reduced fees applied to draws on USD from the Fed’s foreign-currency 
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liquidity swap lines and extended the terms of those facilities. The main goal was to mitigate 
the effects of the strains in financial markets to the supply of credit to businesses and 
households. The measures improved the financial conditions in the euro area and narrow 
euro-dollar FX swap basis spreads. 
Determinants of NBS FX swaps 
The National Bank of Serbia introduced FX swaps with the aim of stabilizing the 
domestic FX market and minimizing RSD volatility. 
In direct trading with domestic commercial banks the NBS can swap sales of EUR for 
RSD or swap purchases of EUR for RSD. As part of FX swap transactions, the NBS performs 
spot and forward transaction at the same time. It simultaneously sells/purchases EUR on the 
spot date and purchases/sells the same amount on the forward date. Swap transactions can 
be organized as auctions or as direct transactions called “bilateral swaps” (based on a 
commercial bank’s3 request or as requested by the NBS). All transactions carried out to date 
were conducted as auctions. Swap auctions are conducted via the web platform dubbed 
“Monetary Operations of the National Bank of Serbia – Application for Foreign Exchange 
Trading”. 
In practice, foreign currency is sold/purchased by using spot exchange rate and swap 
points defined by the NBS in advance - auctions at fixed swap points. The swap points are 
calculated by using the following formula: 
Swap points = spot exchange rate *  000,10*1
360
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Forward exchange rate = spot exchange rate + (swap points/10,000) 
 
Where:  
k1 - annual interest rate for the EUR, with two decimal places 
k2 - annual interest rate for the RSD, with two decimal places 
d - transaction maturity 
However, the NBS bylaw allows variable swap points auctions, i.e. swap points can be 
bid by banks. Auctions at variable swap points can result in the NBS purchase/sell foreign 
exchange at swap points bid by the bank whose bid was accepted at the auction (auction at 
variable swap points), or the NBS can purchase/sell foreign exchange at the same swap 
points from each bank whose bid was accepted at the auction (auction at single swap 
points). 
The key elements of a swap contract are: type of a swap; type of auction; EUR/RSD spot 
rate; swap points (in case they are fixed); transaction maturity; spot and forward date; and 
minimal amount that a bank can bid for. Banks, previously notified about the auction and 
provided with key information from the decision on organization of auction, submit bids to 
                                                     
3In further text banks/bank 
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the NBS. Fixed swap points auction allows only one bid per bank, in which the bank 
indicates the amount of foreign exchange to be swap purchased/sold within the swap points 
announced by the NBS in advance. Where commercial banks’ total bids are higher than the 
central bank’s auction offer, the NBS assigns currency to each bank in proportion to its bid. 
Variable swap points auction allows commercial banks to send not only one, but several 
purchase/sell bids. The NBS ranks bids depending on the level of swap points specified, 
ranking them from the lowest to highest. The Governor, or a person authorized by him/her, 
decides on the lowest and/or highest swap points that a bid may contain to be accepted 
(marginal swap points), and on the total amount of funds that the NBS swap 
purchases/sells. 
In a multiple swap points auction, the NBS will make transactions with banks whose bids 
are accepted. In a single swap points auction, the transactions will be conducted with all 
banks whose bids are accepted, at the same swap points, i.e. marginal swap points.  
In bilateral swap trading between the NBS and banks, each bank submits a single swap 
bid that states the amount requested. The NBS responds by sending a bid which includes 
data about the spot FX rate and the level of swap points at which it is ready to make the 
transaction. Finally, the bank takes into account the NBS’s bid and replies to it on the same 
day. Alternatively, the NBS can refuse the bid and notify the commercial bank of its refusal 
on the same day.  
 
Chart 2. NBS FX Swaps  
 
Source: National Bank of Serbia 
 
Beginning in May 2009, the NBS held regular FX swap auctions with an average maturity 
of two weeks. Banks did not show much interest as the swap rates were uncompetitive. In 
2010 the NBS continued to organize two-week foreign exchange swaps, but without any real 
success. Between April and July 2010, the NBS made changes and organized auctions of 
three-month FX swaps. The goal was to use FX swaps as a regular instrument of EUR/RSD 
liquidity supply, as well as to encourage interbank swap trading and the development of the 
FX hedging market, sorely needed in Serbia. A total of 28 swap auctions were held during 
that year, with the NBS selling EUR 109.2mn and buying EUR 152.5mn. In early March 2011, 
the NBS once more introduced auction of three-month FX swaps, and organized 88 of them 
in total. The balance for 2011 was: the NBS sold EUR 179.5mn to banks and bought EUR 
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185.0mn from them. At year-end, the total amount of receivables swapped by the NBS stood 
at EUR 111.0mn, while the amount of payables stood at EUR 49.0mn. 
In 2012, the NBS continued holding weekly auctions, organized under market conditions 
and offering limited quantities. During the first half of the year, until June 30, the NBS 
organized 52 auctions of three-month FX swaps resulting in the sale of 116mn EUR and the 
purchase of 123mn EUR. On that day, the balance of receivables swapped by the NBS stood 
at EUR 16.0mn and that of payables at EUR 36.0mn. 
Impact of FX swaps as a monetary tool of the NBS 
Without any doubt, the NBS introduced FX swaps with the intention to use it as a 
monetary tool to control significant RSD volatility and improve the liquidity of banks. This 
has been a concerted effort aimed at changing the classical model of monetary policy by 
introducing derivatives, previously not used in the Serbian underdeveloped market. 
The current RSD FX regime, a so-called “managed float”, is fundamentally unstable. It is 
directly dependent on the level and structure of the central bank’s reserves, which are 
recovering with great difficulty, sustained only by significant NBS interventions on the inter-
bank FX market, and determined by FDI inflows and the level of liquid commercial banks’ 
foreign currency reserves. Domestic currency FX rates are highly sensitive and easy 
influenced by lobbying groups able to speculatively destabilize them. The Serbian dinar used 
to be additionally supported by an effectively positive and significantly high key monetary 
policy rate (repo rate). 
The consequences of the above exchange rate regime are: 
1. Frequent NBS interventions; 
2. Decrease in net foreign assets; 
3. Significant depreciation of RSD. 
NBS interventions were the only tool used to control the stability of the national 
currency; moreover, during the 2000s, they were insignificant. Rare interventions and 
occasional appreciation of the dinar were the result of net capital inflows as the result of 
privatization, net foreign borrowing, a significantly high key policy rate, and acceptably high 
foreign exchange and RSD reserve requirements for commercial banks. The high level of 
foreign currency reserves provided the capacity for defending the national currency even 
during the global financial slump. Therefore, during 2008 and 2009, the NBS intervened to 
protect the RSD within a reasonable bracket. 
The first major attacks on the Serbian dinar started in the last quarter of 2009 and 
continued until late 2010. In the last quarter of 2009, the NBS intervened by using large 
amounts, on average EUR 50 million per month, with the aim of keeping the targeted 
exchange rate. At some point the NBS had to intervene with up to EUR 100 million per day, 
in order to prevent the psychological margin of 100 RSD/EUR from being exceeded, as this 
would have been considered as a definite sign of a wrong monetary policy and the end of the 
contended RSD managed float. 
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Chart 3. Monthly NBS Interventions, 2008-2011, in millions of EUR 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Serbia 
 
The psychological threshold was crossed on 17 May 2010, and the NBS became less 
enthusiastic about defending the national currency but kept up the high volume of monthly 
interventions (Chart 2 and Chart 3). If NBS continues with this trend, it is certain that the 
foreign reserves – hardly a renewable source – will see a sharp fall. 
 
Chart 4. Annual interventions by the NBS for period 2008-2011 in millions of EUR 
 
Source: National Bank of Serbia 
 
The research shows that despite enormous interventions in 2010, there has been no 
noticeable decrease in the amount of foreign currency reserves: conversely, they even grew 
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by EUR 180 million in April. Although one hopes that the increase was the result of 
economic growth or greater exports, in fact it was a consequence of the inflow of funds 
drawn under a stand-by arrangement with the IMF. At first sight, the national foreign 
reserves might seem reasonably high and stable, at times providing cover for the money 
supply (M1) of over 400 per cent (for example in January 2010 the cover stood at 442%). 
However, the essence of the problem is the structure of the foreign reserves, which are very 
fragile and are mostly the result of national monetary policy measures, primarily the level of 
foreign currency reserve requirements. 
 
Chart 5. Structure of NBS Foreign Reserves 
 
Source: National Bank of Serbia 
 
According to our research, net foreign assets, the key part of foreign exchange reserves, 
amount to some EUR 6 billion (Chart 4). The remaining amount is the direct result of the 
already mentioned drawing of funds under the IMF standby arrangement and reserve 
requirements for banks. As we have shown, 2010 saw dips in foreign reserves as a result of 
periodical and aggressive NBS interventions, but, on the other hand, their permanent 
renewal was rooted in foreign borrowing and reserve requirements. Therefore, the structure 
of foreign reserves has been changing, yet without any significant change in their total 
amount. Any further analysis of the impact of FX on monetary stability and the likelihood of 
the NBS using different monetary tools, we need to point out that net foreign assets are a 
cornerstone of negotiations between the NBS and the IMF. The quantitative requirement, 
according to the stand-by arrangement, means that the minimal level of net foreign assets 
had to be EUR 4.8 billion in September and EUR 4.6 billion in December 2010. As the 
monetary policy outlined above includes continuous and regular NBS interventions, the 
bottom level of required net foreign currency assets will be reached quickly, leaving the NBS 
in a position to change the policy or tools used to date. 
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Chart 6. Net Foreign Assets, 2008-2010, in Billions of EUR 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Serbia 
 
The third consequence of using a “managed float” exchange rate regime has been the 
significant depreciation of RSD. Although FX swaps and many other monetary tools are used 
to stabilize the national currency, distinct exchange rate volatility emerged in the last quarter 
of 2008 (Table 4). Constant depreciation to date may seem like modest decline, but, on the 
contrary, it is a significant drop when one bears in mind the amount of interventions recently 
made by the NBS. Average annual depreciation for the seven-year period equals 6.90%. If we 
exclude 2006, when the RSD appreciated against the EUR by 7.60%, we can conclude that the 
average annual depreciation equalled 8.97%. Total depreciation since the introduction of the 
euro stands at 67.65%. 
 
Table 4. Depreciation of RSD for period 2003 until 2011  
 
Date RSD middle exchange rate Depreciation of RSD (%) 
01.01.2003 68.5845 - - 
31.12.2003 68.3129 -0.40 Appreciation 
31.12.2004 78.8850 15.48 Depreciation 
31.12.2005 85.5000 8.39 Depreciation 
31.12.2006 79.0000 -7.60 Appreciation 
31.12.2007 79.2362 0.30 Depreciation 
31.12.2008 88.6010 11.82 Depreciation 
31.12.2009 95.8888 8.23 Depreciation 
31.12.2010 105.4962 10.01 Depreciation 
31.12.2011 104.6409 -0.81 Appreciation 
Source: National Bank of Serbia 
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In the first six months of 2010, the dinar depreciated against the euro by 7.67%. A detailed 
examination of the depreciation at the monthly level is given in Table 5. The impact on the 
dinar first became apparent at the beginning of the year and grew until May, when the NBS 
was forced to intervene in the foreign exchange market with EUR 359 million, bringing the 
total amount expended since the beginning of the year to EUR 1,118.5 million. Despite the 
aggressive interventions not much was achieved, and the dinar lost more ground to the euro. 
The volatility of the RSD exchange rate is not the embodiment of banking and economic 
dogma. It is permanently reduced by ex post facto interventions.  
 
Table 5. Depreciation of RSD in 2010 and 2011  
 
Date RSD middle exchange rate Depreciation of RSD (%) 
31.12.2009 95.8888 8.23 Depreciation 
31.01.2010 98.4620 2.63 Depreciation 
28.02.2010 99.6337 1.19 Depreciation 
31.03.2010 99.7604 0.13 Depreciation 
30.04.2010 99.2683 -0.49 Appreciation 
31.05.2010 102.7303 3.46 Depreciation 
30.06.2010 104.3704 7.67 Depreciation 
31.07.2010 106.2256 1.78 Depreciation 
31.08.2010 105.1032 -0,56 Appreciation 
30.09.2010 106.1748 1.02 Depreciation 
31.10.2010 107.4270 1.18 Depreciation 
30.11.2010 107.1945 -0.20 Appreciation 
31.12.2010 105.4982 -1.59 Appreciation 
31.01.2011 104.6051 -0.58 Appreciation 
28.02.2011 103.2237 -1.32 Appreciation 
31.03.2011 103.5951 0.35 Depreciation 
30.04.2011 99.6292 -3.84 Appreciation 
31.05.2011 96.9802 -2.64 Appreciation 
30.06.2011 102.4631 5.66 Depreciation 
31.07.2011 102.1251 -0.34 Appreciation 
31.08.2011 101.5836 -0.53 Appreciation 
30.09.2011 101.1732 -0.41 Appreciation 
31.10.2011 100.4852 -0.69 Appreciation 
30.11.2011 103.9741 3.48 Depreciation 
31.12.2011 104.6409 0.65 Depreciation 
Source: National Bank of Serbia 
Conclusion 
Unlike most other derivatives, FX swaps and forwards have fixed payment obligations, 
are physically settled, and are predominantly short-term instruments. Since the time they 
appeared in the intervention toolkits of many central banks around the world, many have 
thought that the popularity of this instrument was not going to last. However, the last crises 
proved them wrong, and the FX forward became a powerful tool for managing the liquidity 
and stability of the financial system. 
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Swap arrangements, allowing central banks to lend each other currencies, become 
contingency measures for crises, such as Europe’s debt problems. The leaders of the BRICS 
countries, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, announced in the fall of 2012 that 
they would study FX swaps as part of a broader effort to move away from reliance on the 
dollar and the euro. 
The introduction of NBS FX swaps is a positive move in the development of the Serbian 
FX market. However, this instrument – originally intended to stabilize the daily volatility of 
the RSD currency rate – has not had the expected effects. The critically small number of 
auctions and volumes led to corresponding effects on the level of national FX reserves, level 
of net foreign assets, volume of NBS interventions and appreciation/depreciation of national 
currency. Furthermore, the NBS has failed to join any currency swap line, as expected. The 
NBS’s main role was predominantly to mediate between banks that bid/offered foreign 
currencies through FX swaps; the NBS did not use much of its reserves for FX transactions. 
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Razvoj srpskog forexa preko svop transakcija Narodne 
banke Srbije 
 
 
REZIME – Ovaj rad ističe glavne ciljeve korišćenja derivata kao monetarnih instrumenata, 
povećanje devizne likvidnosti poslovnih banaka i kontrolisanje volatilnosti nacionalne valute. 
Tokom proteklih nekoliko godina devizni svopovi, koji se vrlo često mešaju sa valutnim svopovima, 
postali su popularan monetarni instrument centralnih banaka. Od 2007. svop kreditne linije među 
centralnim bankama postale su primer za podršku devizne likvidnosti domaćih poslovnih banaka. 
Narodna banka Srbije uvela je devizne svop transakcije, kao deo podrške finansijskoj stabilnosti 
zemlje. Naše istraživanje pokazuje da NBS nije deo svop kreditne linije, već interno koristi devizni 
svop na vrlo fragmentiran način. Obim trgovanja na novim instrumentima je prilično skroman. 
Neprimetno uvođenje deviznih svopova nije uspelo da dobije značajniji uticaj na stabilizaciju domaće 
valute, i izazvalo je prilično mali porast likvidnosti evra. Na samom kraju vredi pomenuti da je, bez 
obzira na prve rezultate, samo pojavljivanje svopova Narodne banke srbije znači da je srpsko tržište 
derivata "prešlo Rubikon".  
 
KLJUČNE REČI: devizni svop, monetarna politika, centralna banka, devizna likvidnost, 
volatilnost dinara, Narodna banka Srbije  
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